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SYMPOSIUM ARTICLES
TAXING THE INTERNATIONAL
TRANSFER OF INFORMATION
David Williams*
I. INTRODUCTION
Thirty-seven years ago, when my father-in-law came to New
York to lecture, it took him five days to travel each way. Send-
ing documents took even longer. It is now commonplace not only
that we can quickly cross the Atlantic for brief trips but that we
send texts instantly by bouncing them electronically down a
telephone line. Others, indeed, do not now bother to come at all
but rely on a live interactive satellite link to communicate their
message. Such is technology. I have much sympathy with Max
Frisch, when he defined technology as "the knack of so arrang-
ing the world that we don't have to experience it."'
One result of rapid transit, and even more of international
transfers of information, IT, as we now ominously term it, is
that flows of information between countries have developed
much faster than the political and legal frameworks within
which we handle the results of such flows. This difference in de-
velopment is apparent in the taxation of international flows of
information or in the results of those flows.
Ironically, there seems to have been something of an infor-
mation gap here for those handling flows of information. They
seem significantly unaware of the ways in which tax systems in-
teract with information flows.2 That of itself is reason enough for
* Solicitor of the Supreme Court of England and Wales. Price Waterhouse Professor
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1. PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF MODERN QUOTATIONS 123 (2d ed. 1980). Frisch is also
quoted by the Penguin Dictionary of Modem Quotations as prophesying that "the day
will come when there will be no more traffic at all and only newlyweds will travel." Id.
2. The main United Kingdom works dealing specifically with taxation of intellectual
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these proceedings.
II. A CLASH OF Two SYSTEMS
It may be that this information gap is a result in part of a
mismatch between the two kinds of systems. Although our sys-
tems for transferring information, both directly and indirectly,
have advanced in an exponential manner in recent decades, our
tax systems have not. We are repeatedly told that an old tax is a
good tax. There is much wisdom in that from a political stand-
point. The result is that tax systems have a major handicap in
confronting modern technological developments. They are acting
with old - in some cases ancient - techniques to identify what
is taxable in things much newer.
Those running tax systems also have another problem,
though they themselves rarely categorize it as a problem. Tax
systems are based on territorially defined units of government
with mutually exclusive law systems, in other words, states.
Both the concept of a state and the methods most often used to
raise taxes for states were created before the flows which we are
now considering were within human comprehension.
As we know, tax systems analysts have long learned to han-
dle jurisdictional problems. When dealing with direct taxes, we
have rules to locate the taxpayer. Most hold that the general
rules of international public law require some effective connec-
tion between a state and a person it seeks to tax.3 That link can
be found through nationality, or through some other material
connection between the individual or legal person and the state.
We generally label this connection as residence.
Alternatively or additionally, we can concentrate on the lo-
cation of the tax base which we seek to tax. This approach,
which we label the source approach, allows us to tax when we
can identify the things, or the profits, that we seek to tax as
being within the boundaries of the state. All we need is a set of
rules that tell us how to locate taxable items or flows. Of course,
property, and information generally, are: A. SHIPWRIGHT & J. PRICE, U.K. TAXATION AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1989) and R. GALLA ENT & N. EASTAWAY, TAXATION OF INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND TAXATION (1989).
3. For discussion on this point, see F. MANN, THE DOCTRINE OF JURISDICTION IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW, 1 RECUXIL DES COURS, 9, 109-19 (1964). For a discussion of the oppo-
site view that there are no limits, see Qureshi, The Freedom of a State to Legislate in
Fiscal Matters under General International Law, 41 BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL DOCUMEN-
TATION 14 (1987). R. MARTHA, THE JURISDICTION TO TAX IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1989).
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the choices of linking mechanisms available to a state often re-
sult in two or more states maintaining claims to tax the same
source of revenue or the same taxpayer, and we have also started
to learn how to handle that.4 This approach serves for both di-
rect and indirect taxes.
Historically, states developed their own individual or re-
gional answers to the problem of defining the jurisdictional ex-
tent of their tax laws just as they evolved their own patterns of
taxation, direct and indirect. States had what we might term
their own tax "footprints" just as individuals have their own ge-
netic "footprints," the explanation in both cases being embed-
ded in individual ancestry. They could evolve their systems in
isolation from other states - isolated not just geographically
and legally, but economically as well. Often that isolation was
reinforced by a lack of information. Not so now. IT has had a
direct effect on tax systems as on all else.5
That insular approach to taxation worked well when real
wealth lay in land and profits in basic merchandises. That was,
of course, the way it was when customs duties were invented.
The old tax structures of countries like England (only later was
it to become a customs union called the United Kingdom) relied
heavily on customs duties because they were easy to administer.6
4. I say "started to learn" because much double taxation still exists, despite the
efforts of, for example, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) with its Model Double Taxation Convention, widely adopted by member states,
including the Usited States. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELoP-
MENT MODEL CONVENTION FOR THE AvonANcE OF DouLE TAXATION (1977) [hereinafter
OECD MODEL TREATY].
For a brief summary of the United States rules, see R. DOERNBERG, INTERNATIONAL
TAXATION (1989). For a summary of the United Kingdom rules, see D. DAVIES, PRINcI-
PLES OF INTERNATIONAL DOUBLE TAXATION RELIEF (1985).
5. One of the fascinating developments in this area in recent years is the breadth of
available comparative studies of national tax systems, both officially (through bodies
such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the OECD) and pri-
vately. Perhaps the best of the private comparisons is that published by Price
Waterhouse in two annual volumes: CoRPoRATE TAXEs - A WORLDWIDE SUMMARY and
INDIVIDUAL TAXES - A WORLDWIDE SUMMARY. Coopers and Lybrand also publishes an
annual volume of INTERNATIONAL TAX SUMMARIES. They ensure that a taxpayer is well
able to take any decision aware of its consequences in any major legal system. This itself
leads to the competition between tax systems that has been a growing feature of recent
years, with a noticeable effect on the shape of individual tax systems (for example, the
growth of tax havens and of "low tax" regimes in higher tax states).
6. It is easy to forget just how significant a share of national revenue used to be
earned for many centuries in many states through import and export taxes, including
internal import and export taxes between different parts of a state. For a fascinating
brief history, see C. WEBBER & A. WILDAVSKY, A HISTORY OF TAXATION AND EXPENDITURE
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The Bible and even older sources show us our forefathers have
done this since commerce began. When goods were taken
through the frontier, they were easy to identify, classify, and
value. The debt could be quantified immediately and indemni-
fied effectively.
III. PUTTING NEW WINE IN OLD BOTTLES
The idea that one day we could tax intangibles as they en-
tered or left a state might have occurred to the churches, but not
to practical men sitting at the receipt of customs.7 Even when
Oscar Wilde claimed at the New York Custom House, as he did
not so many years ago, that "I have nothing to declare but my
genius"8 he would, I am sure, have been taken aback if he had
been told that "genius" was taxable under some four figure
number of the common customs nomenclature on a royalty ba-
sis. But why not if, as Edison told us, genius is one percent in-
spiration and ninety-nine percent perspiration?9
It is not only customs duties that present us with problems.
Do not forget that when another genius - this time himself a
Scottish Customs officer1 - invented income tax a couple of
centuries ago, not only had the electric telegraph and electric
light not been invented, neither had the joint stock company.
Our income tax law in the United Kingdom is, as a result, very
untidy1 when it comes to' dealing with intangibles, seemingly
having a different answer for each form in which intellectual
property can be encapsulated, and only compromise answers for
dealing with know-how. 2 Unsurprisingly, it is lacking any gen-
eral overall policy.
We do have some new taxes, in particular the Value Added
IN THE WESTERN WORLD (1986).
7. Matthew 9:9.
8. F. HARRIS, OSCAR WILDE 44 (1959).
9. EDISON, LIFE, ch. 24.
10. Adam Smith (1723-1790), author of THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776).
11. It is very untidy - period. Do not be misled by the irregular attempts to consol-
idate it (the latest of which is the Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988 (1988 Act)
[herinafter 1988 Act]). These acts consolidate and ossify, not codify. They conceal the
law that has come unchanged from the first of the "modern" income tax acts in the
United Kingdom, the Act of 1803. But the essential shape, and many of the key phrases,
of the current legislation is still that of 1803.
12. The current laws are found in the 1988 Act. 1988 Act, supra note 11, at §§ 520-
533 (patents and know-how), §§ 534-537 (copyright and public lending right), § 538 (re-
lief for painters, sculptors and other artists).
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Tax (VAT) or general Goods and Services Tax (GST). But, as
we shall see, even these present problems in devising the appro-
priate way to tax international flows of information. VAT can
operate internationally on one of two bases - the origin basis or
the destination basis.13 The origin basis assumes that tax is lev-
ied in the state where the supply commences. Tax is levied on
the goods when created, and the tax is therefore "exported" with
the goods. By contrast, the destination basis assumes that the
tax applies in the state where the supply is received. The sup-
plies are exempt from tax in the state of creation, but are taxed
in the state of consumption. For imports, this means that they.
are subjected to a tax charge or "border tax adjustment" at the
time of import.
The current basis of VAT within the European Community
(EC) is the destination basis,14 which is easy to apply to supplies
of goods. How does it work for a cross-border supply of informa-
tion services? The answer is that it cannot work in any readily
enforceable manner because you cannot intercept information at
the frontier and inflict a border tax adjustment on it. Further-
more, you cannot tax the supplier of information where it is re-
ceived, because he is not there. Only if you have something tan-
gible can this approach work. These might appear to be trite
statements, but they go to the very heart of the conceptual basis
of VAT and they show that even with a new tax the problems we
review today have no easy answer.
It is this set of faulty instruments which provides states
with their current techniques for the task of taxing information
flows. It is therefore not surprising that difficulties occur. I
would like to raise and explore further two points of difficulty
which particularly concern me.
A. The Problem of Excessive Taxation
The first difficulty is the extent to which these imperfect
approaches result in excessive taxation on transfers of informa-
tion. I have a straightforward concern in addressing that issue. If
13. For an excellent review of these issues, see B. TE A, SALEs TAXATION: THE CASE
OF VALUE ADDED TAX IN THE EuRoPEAN CoMMuNrry (1988).
14. This is laid down for all European Community (EC) member states by the Sixth
Value Added Tax (VAT) Directive. Sixth Council Directive of 17 May 1977 on the har-
monization of the laws of the member states relating to turnover taxes - Common sys-
tem of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 145) 1
(1977) [hereinafter Sixth VAT Directive].
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there is excessive taxation, that is, taxation greater than that
which will be met if the information does not cross frontiers, le-
gitimate cross-border information flows will be impeded. That is
of itself a bad thing, both in the developed world and in the
developing world.
B. The Problem of Sharing the Cake
My second concern is that within the agreed levies of taxa-
tion, states share on a fair basis the available revenues. But what
is fair, and on what defensible rationale can one attribute the
value of an information flow to one state rather than another?
Does a rationale valid for one tax apply for the others, or do
inconsistent criteria emerge because of the different taxes in-
volved, with the answers depending on the relative weight of the
different taxes used? To set the scene, let us examine in turn
each of the main forms of tax, and where the contrasting claims
to jurisdiction arise. It may be convenient to start with customs
duties as they are the oldest taxes.
IV. CUSTOMS DuTIEs
The moment we examine the application of customs duties,
we have to accept that the transfer of information takes place in
many ways. To levy a duty, there must of course be a "good." If
any of those ways achieves a material form, then it can amount
to a good on which a customs levy can be imposed.
How do you distinguish goods from information? There is
one kind of boundary to the levy of duty on goods, although it is
very hard to define - it is the difference between letting the
information itself go, as against the products which exploit that
information. Hence, the invention of such things as copyright
and patents, and the rights to enforce forms of intellectual prop-
erty beyond frontiers. These extraterritorial rights create one of
the bigger headaches in customs valuation.
In 1984 the Committee on Customs Valuation recommended
that one aspect of knowledge transfer need no longer form the
basis for customs valuation - the software aspect of imported
computer programs.15 Provided that the value of the software is
encoded, for example, onto a diskette which is declared sepa-
15. Decision of the Tenth Meeting of the Committee on Customs Valuation on 24
September 1984 on Valuation of Carrier Media Bearing Software for Data Processing
Equipment, COMMSSION OF THE EURoPEAN COMMUNrrms, CUSTOMS VALUATION (1988).
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rately from the value of the diskette, the accompanying manual,
and the packaging, it can be ignored.16
Another factor behind the problem of the value of informa-
tion as it crosses frontiers is that it continues to have earning
capacity of an uncertain amount beyond the price charged for
the import, and that capacity can be exploited through any kind
of enforceable royalty agreement. This has led to the common
customs valuation rule that royalties and fees which form part of
the price paid by the buyer have to be included in the customs
valuation. 17 This point has led to some practical difficulty, and
therefore to elaboration by the customs codes, because of the
need to recoup through what was designed as a one-off tax on
unknown series of receipts.
Here we have our first tax charge, an inward barrier which
can impose costs on the inward movement of information by ref-
erence to the customs value of any associated good, so that the
taxable value can reflect not only the current price but the fu-
ture earning potential of the item being imported. It can there-
fore be a continuing charge. In effect, our customs regime can
become a value added tax regime levying internally generated
revenues.
V. GENERAL TAXEs ON SUPPLIES
Alongside the customs charge on the import of any good is a
border tax adjustment for value added tax or goods and services
tax, usually without any offset between the two taxes. In the
case of the twelve member states of the EC, VAT is the only
relevant internal tax."' In some form, perhaps as a GST, it is
16. This rule is incorporated in the EC rules on Customs Valuation by article 8a of
the Council Regulation of 28 May 1980 on the valuation of goods for customs purposes,
23 O.J. Eun. COMM. (No. L. 134) 1 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 Regulation on valuation for
customs purposes], as amended by Council Regulation of 23 April 1985 amending Regu-
lation No. 1224/80 on the valuation of goods for customs purposes, 28 O.J. Eur. COMM.
(No. L. 112) 50 (1985).
17. This rule is adopted by the EC in article 8 of the 1980 Regulation on valuation
for customs purposes. 1980 Regulation on valuation for customs purposes, supra note
16, at art. 8. See also Commission Regulation of 9 November 1983 on the incidence of
royalties and licence fees in customs value, 26 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L. 309) 19 (1983)
which implements article 8.
18. This is provided by the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community
(Treaty of Rome), 298 U.N.T.S. 11, at art. 99, as implemented by the First VAT Direc-
tive, Consultation publique no 559 de la R~publique centrafricaine pour un programme
financ6 partiellement par la Communautg 6conomique europ~ene - Fonds europ~en
de dsveloppement, 10 J.O. CoMm. EUR. 14 (1967).
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now the prevalent approach of states.'9 This tax allows us to im-
pose an internal tax on both goods and services, and therefore
allows the transfer for consideration of information to be taxed
as such, rather than through its association with something
tangible.
For those of you not familiar with VAT, it is designed so
that it can tax the supply of any good or service in such a way as
to tax the whole value of the supply to the ultimate consumer by
reference to the amount of value added by each supplier. The
value is measured, as one would expect, by reference to the con-
sideration given for the supply, save where that cannot be mea-
sured or where the transaction is not at arms length.
VAT can deal with cross-frontier supplies in several ways,
but broadly, as we have already noted, it operates either on an
origin basis (relating to the supplier's state) or on a destination
basis (relating to the state where the supply is consumed). At
present the EC, and many other states, operate the tax on a des-
tination basis. To achieve this, any export is exempted, with tax
charged in the exporters state being rebated to the supplier. At
the same time the destination state imposes a border tax adjust-
ment on the item as it is imported at the rate of tax of the desti-
nation state and at the value on import. Earlier this year, how-
ever, the European Commission stated publicly that it would
seek to have the basis of the VAT system changed in 1996 to an
origin based tax. The first steps to that change were agreed by
the Community Council of Finance Ministers at the end of No-
vember 1990.20
The idea of "origin" and "destination" seems fine for goods,
but, again, how does that apply to the supply of information?
How, for example, do you charge a telephone call from Italy to
Ireland during which an Irish lawyer is given advice about Ital-
ian law, which is then confirmed by a meeting between the two
at Brussels airport? The EC's answer, because it cannot easily
locate the supply, is to locate the tax charge on either the sup-
19. See A. TAIT, VALuE-ADDED TAX: INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE AND PROBLEMS (1988).
20. It should be stated that the European Commission's proposal does not have the
full support of states, and may not occur fully. However, it is occurring in part as the
Commission and states work out how to comply with the requirements of the Single
European Act amendments to the Treaty of Rome. This requires, inter alia, that there
be no internal fiscal frontiers within the EC by January 1, 1993. As part of the abolition
of these frontiers, member states must desist from imposing border tax adjustments
from that date, although they may, and will, impose internal adjustments to similar ef-
fect on at least some transactions.
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plier or the person supplied, depending on the kind of service."
In my example of legal services, the supply is regarded as occur-
ring in the state where the person being supplied is based. In
other words, the tax goes to the state benefitting from the infor-
mation flow, not that providing it. This is also the case where
the services include the transfer or assignments of intellectual
property, but other kinds of know-how would be regarded as be-
ing supplied in the state where the person supplying the infor-
mation belongs.
While those are the rules, one may query why they apply to
IT. After all, the economy receiving the information stands to
benefit as well as the economy providing the information. There
is a qualitative difference on that point between goods and ser-
vices - at least information services. If I sell you my goods then
my economy benefits, whereas yours is left neutral. If I pass on
information, the benefits do not so obviously lie only with my
state's economy. Note also another point. In trying to adjust
VAT to this kind of supply, we have shifted the focus from the
location of the supply to the location of the taxpayer. We have
slipped from an indirect tax approach to a direct tax approach.
At present such a supply would, if located in the United
Kingdom, usually be an international supply of services treated
as zero-rated.2 In EC law, this should be an exempt supply. On
either basis, it follows that no tax applies to it within the EC. It
is the stated intention of some EC tax reformers to secure the
abolition of zero-rating and the restriction of exemptions, along
with the change of the system to an origin system. Will this
mean that such flows of information will start to be taxed? It
will, and under such a system the tax will go to the economy
responsible for creating the information flow.
A. Income Taxes
Location is also of the essence for the charge to tax of inter-
national transactions by the main direct income-based taxes.
21. Sixth VAT Directive, supra note 14, at art. 9.
22. See United Kingdom Value Added Tax Act, 1983, sched. 5, group 9 (interna-
tional services), sched. 3 (services supplied where received). "Zero-rating" means that a
tax rate of 0% is applied to the supply, the effect being that no new tax is collected, but
a rebate is allowed of tax incurred by the supplier in making the supply. Supplies that
are exempt do not normally give rise to a reclaim of tax incurred by the supplier, al-
though this does happen with exports. The United Kingdom and EC rules, therefore,
have the same effect.
1991]
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Here, as we have noted, two chief kinds of jurisdictional basis
are advanced. A state may tax anyone resident in that state, or
the state may tax something sourced in the state.
Reading this alongside the basis of a charge to value added
tax, there is room for some confusion. The state to which the
information is sent will be the destination state for VAT pur-
poses. It will also be the state seeking to levy any customs duty
on the supply if it is a dutiable good. But it will at the same
time be the source state of any payment for the information, for
direct tax purposes. Conversely, the supplier's state will be
where the direct tax is to be levied if this occurs on a residence
basis, but for VAT purposes this will be the state of origin,
where an export tax might be levied, but where value added tax
would not be levied on goods and often not on services either.
Returning to the direct taxes, both the source state and res-
idence state may maintain claims to tax. This leads to the classic
double taxation problem, with the state to which the informa-
tion is being transferred levying a withholding tax on the pay-
ment made for that information.23
B. An Example
Let us review the field at that point, and take the example
of a flow of some item of information with associated material
forms from State A to State B. Both are states with aggressive
approaches to taxation. State B has a weak economy and relies
heavily on all forms of taxation. State A has a government which
has made itself popular internally by playing up its national in-
dependence, and it has an assertive tax authority.
A company in State A transfers know-how with related
texts and materials to a company in State B on a royalty basis
so that the State A company will share in the profits (if any)
made in State B utilizing that know-how. State B imposes a roy-
alty-based customs duty on the importer (the State B company).
23. It may be noted that the OECD Model Double Taxation Convention proposes
that amongst developed states there be no withholding tax on royalties, OECD MODEL
TREATY, supra note 4, at art. 12, and this is echoed in the United States Treasury Draft
Model of 1981. Treasury Department's Model Income Tax Treaty, art. 12, Tax Treaties
(CCH) 1 211 (1981). This was not followed by the United Nations Model recommended
by the United Nations Group of Experts to developing states in 1980. U.N. MODEL
DOUBLE TAXATION CoNVrNTION BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING CouNTmIEs, art. 12,
Tax Treaties (CCH) 1 206. It is also still common to find withholding taxes on royalties
between developed states (for example, between Canada and the United States).
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It also has a value added tax working on the destination basis,
and defines this supply as occurring where the know-how is re-
ceived. It therefore imposes a self-supply VAT charge on the re-
cipient in State B. Turning to the direct taxes, a withholding tax
is imposed on the royalty at the basic rate of corporate tax by
the state from which the royalty is paid, State B.
By contrast, State A, which also has a VAT or a general
goods and services tax, defines the tax on an origin basis, and
regards the supply of know-how as occurring in State A. Merci-
fully, it does not compound this by inflicting an export tax - it
believes, it says, in free trade. But it is keen to impose appropri-
ate direct tax on the profits made by the company in State A. It
regards the supply, for direct tax purposes, as occurring in State
A, as it did for indirect tax purposes, and it therefore imposes a
direct tax charge of its own.
There are no tax treaties between State A and State B.24
Further, because State A regards itself as providing satisfactory
direct tax relief by being an exemption country (that is, it only
taxes revenues sourced in it, not sourced overseas), it provides
no unilateral tax relief for the withholding tax applied by State
B because, it argues, State B has no competence to impose that
tax.
VI. THE SCOPE FOR OVERLAP
In summary, it is possible under legitimate present alterna-
tives for State B (to which the information is supplied) to im-
pose a royalty-based customs duty, plus a royalty-based value
added tax, plus a royalty-based withholding tax, while State A
(to which the consideration is paid) also imposes a royalty-based
value added or general sales tax, and an income tax charge on
the full profits from the transfer.
There is, of course, no offset between the direct and indirect
taxes or between border tax charges under VAT and customs
duties. The one forum which could meet this issue, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trades, has yet to tackle this problem
and at present has other, more important issues before it. 25
The result is that the direct information flow will not occur.
24. For one effect of such a treaty, see supra note 23.
25. This remark was written in early December 1990, just as the four year Uruguay
round was reaching what seemed to be breakdown point on other issues, thus preventing
progress on the proposals before it for a general agreement on trade in services.
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You may object that my example is too extreme, believing that
things do not happen that way. But I ask you to consider why
not? Who should back down - State A or State B? Is it any
more valid that the recipient state should impose tax than the
sending state? We need to identify criteria which tell us who
should have the right to levy these taxes, and which taxes should
apply. That said, I accept that the example is extreme and in
practice things are not quite as bad. Withholding taxes are often
mitigated, with credit being allowed for that tax when profits are
taxed in the other state. VAT is usually imposed at the destina-
tion only.
I have left out of this example another area of controversy,
namely the right of national tax authorities to enter reservations
to the values put by the supplier and the supplied on these
transfers. We can easily add the little complication to our flow
from State A to State B, that the two tax authorities dispute the
true value of the information flow, with State B, to which the
information flows, suggesting the royalty value is, or should be,
higher than that accepted by State A. I have also left out - and
perhaps I should not have done so - any issues of stamp duties
and payments from monopoly licenses.2 6
A. Cutting the Cake
In my example, if the VAT rates and direct tax rates are at
roughly the same rate level in both countries, then the customs
duty will tilt the balance of relative amounts of tax collected in
favor of State B, that is, the state receiving the information. If
VAT or a general sales tax were to be on a destination basis in
both states (as is usually the case),27 the tilt would be further in
favor of State B. If State A and State B had a standard model
double taxation agreement on Organization for Economic Co-op-
eration and Development lines and State A granted credit to
State B in respect of its withholding, as again is usually the
case,2" State B's share might be further confirmed, although
probably limited to perhaps ten percent for that particular tax.
Alternatively, there might be no withholding tax. The practice of
this is not consistent.
26. These may become important in states where the direct taxes are less important
- for example, Hong Kong.
27. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
28. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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This example shows that current forms of tax systems seem
to skew the tax collection operation in favor of the country re-
ceiving the information, as between the two states. Is that justi-
fiable? If the response of the exporting state, in observing this, is
to endeavour to increase its share of the value exported by
means of profit adjustments, is that justifiable?
B. Compliance Problems
So far we have looked at the problems of the states involved
in any clashes. What of the individual taxpayer? The presence
of several competing taxes, all relevant to the shareout of the
continuing royalty, suggest that, viewed from the taxpayer's
point of view, there are two problems. One is the potential
weight of the taxes themselves. The other lies with compliance
costs, the administrative procedures necessary on the part of
those undertaking information flows. The latter, as well as the
former, might be viewed as a barrier to information flow. If there
is such a barrier, is it a necessary evil? Should we be seeking
international agreements to curb the use of some of these taxes?
If we do curb, should we favor the receiving state or the sending
state in our choice of curbs?
In reviewing any answers we have to these quandaries, we
might have to come up with two sets of answers, those for devel-
oped states and those for developing states. It does not follow
that the balance as between two states, both of which are well
developed as generators and as utilizers of information and
knowledge worthy of being turned into intellectual property,
should also apply as between one such state and another which
has no such abilities or resources.
Perhaps we ought to look at it more positively from the
point of view of the suppliers of information. Professor Cathe-
rine Brown of the University of Calgary does this in her recent
volume on Tax Aspects of the Transfer of Technology. 9 Her
viewpoint is that both the developing nations of the Asia-Pacific
Rim (which are the main subjects of her detailed survey) and
Canada "are in accord that technology transfers are imperative
to the future well-being of their respective economies." 0 But,
29. C. BROWN, TAX ASPECTS OF THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY: THE ASIA-PAcIFIC
RIM, Canadian Tax Paper No. 87 (Canadian Tax Foundation, 1990) [hereinafter C.
BROWN].
30. C. BROWN, supra note 29, at 442.
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she notes in that same passage, in concluding her excellent sur-
vey: "Notwithstanding this, Canadian transferors are attempting
to conclude international transfer agreements under Canadian
taxing norms that are replete with uncertainties as well as im-
pediments to technology transfers."3 1
VII. CONCLUSION
I have made no attempt in these remarks to address de-
tailed problems. Others will, I am sure, indicate where some of
them lie. My chief point is to emphasize that the very nature of
the various incompatible forms of tax we use make it unlikely
that there are no impediments, and make it likely that states are
- wittingly or otherwise - asserting jurisdiction for some taxes
in a way that will dampen information flows, and may produce
unfair shares between states. In saying that, I have not at-
tempted to define or limit in any way the many forms in which
information flows can cross states, by any form of intellectual
property or'agreement relating to intangibles, or by redeploying
employees, or just simply telephoning someone.
We are faced with three areas for development in our ap-
proaches if we wish fully to remove the tax problems I outlined
in this paper. First, we have to identify, and apply, criteria of
fairness and efficiency as between the taxers and the taxed to
the multiple kinds of taxation which can apply to information
flows across borders. Second, we have to decide between the
states involved, which has a claim to tax under all these taxes or,
preferably, just some of them. If we do not, we may fail to deal
with the first problem. Third, once we have decided on the opti-
mal approach, we have to remove as many as possible of the
technical snags that abound, lest those technical snags them-
selves increase both the tax burden and the compliance costs.
31. C. BROWN, supra note 29, at 442.
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